[FDE] Intro and EFS as a viable FDE solution?

Curt Wilson curtw at siu.edu
Wed Nov 8 09:40:37 MST 2006


Disclaimer: I'm not a crypto expert.

My understanding on breaking EFS was that the local Administrator
account was automatically a key recovery agent, and therefore if someone
can obtain the system, boot into a linux distro and edit out the
Administrator password, reboot, login as Administrator with the now
blanked out password, a recovery could be done that would then allow
decryption of any EFS contents.   This leads me to believe that FDE is
the best way to go, because a bootable linux distro won't be of any use
to an attacker.

if you know otherwise, please let me know. I have not tested this
personally.



Mike Johnson wrote:
> Howdy all,
> 
> Just found this list while looking for information about full disk 
> encryption for an enterprise.  We're approaching it as a two phase 
> implementation, where the first phase may be tossed.  We have a 
> short-term need (mandate) to implement encryption on a few (about fifty) 
> sensitive laptops.  Long term, we want all our laptops encrypted.
> 
> We're looking at EFS because, well, it's free.  We've been doing 
> research on it, its limitations and its weaknesses.  Some of the 
> weaknesses seem to go away once you implement it on domain resident 
> systems.  EFS may simply be a short term solution for us, but we're not 
> sure how it'll scale/work across several thousand laptops.
> 
> Has anyone on this list done FDE on a large scale?
> 
> Oh, and, howdy. :)
> 
> Thanks!
> Mike
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-- 
Curt Wilson
IT Network Security Officer
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
618-453-6237

GnuPG key: http://www.infotech.siu.edu/security/curtw.pub.asc



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